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Contrast effects in judgmental forecasting when assessing the implications of worst- 
and best-case scenarios 
Abstract 
Two experiments investigated whether individuals’ forecasts of the demand for products and a stock market 
index assuming a best or worst-case scenario depend on whether they have seen a single scenario in 
isolation or whether they have also seen a second scenario presenting an opposing view of  the future.   
Normatively, scenarios should be regarded as belonging to different plausible future worlds so that the 
judged implications of one scenario should not be affected when other scenarios are available. However, the 
results provided evidence of contrast effects in that the presentation of a second ‘opposite’ scenario led to 
more extreme forecasts consistent with the polarity of the original scenario. In addition, people were more 
confident about their forecasts based on a given scenario when two opposing scenarios were available.   We 
examine the implications of our findings for the elicitation of point forecasts and judgmental prediction 
intervals and the biases that are often associated with them. 
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Contrast effects in judgmental forecasting when assessing the implications of worst- 
and best-case scenarios 
 
1.  Introduction 
When considering the future, people often speak in terms of ‘best-case’ and ‘worst-case’ scenarios. 
Scenarios are also used in businesses and other organisations to plan strategies that will cope with alternative 
possible futures (e.g. Goodwin and Wright, 2014).  A key characteristic of these scenarios is that they 
represent mutually exclusive (though usually not mutually exhaustive) plausible combinations of future 
events. Each scenario represents a different possible future world with a specific set of implications for a 
decision maker.  For example, a scenario involving a series of political events that result in peace in the 
Middle East could imply a low price for oil on the world markets at a given future date. A scenario 
involving continued conflict in that region could imply a high price for oil, as extraction is suspended and 
supplies are disrupted. Note that the implications are conditional only on the occurrence of the scenario on 
which they are based. The possibility that the ‘continued conflict’ scenario might prevail should have no 
relevance to the estimated price of oil that would be associated with the ‘peace’ scenario  -each scenario 
represents a different future world. 
However, it is known that effect of a stimulus is often context dependent (Plous, 1993, p38). As 
Plous argues: ‘[People] do not perceive and remember material in isolation; they interpret new information 
in light of past experience and the context in which the material occurs.’  This suggests there is a possibility 
that, when presented with different mutually-exclusive scenarios, and asked to estimate the implication of 
each scenario, people’s estimate for a given scenario may be influenced by the content of the alternative 
scenarios that they have  recently studied.  For example, having just read a worst-case scenario, a person’s 
point forecast of  a variable, assuming  a best-case scenario may be more or less optimistic than it would be 
if the latter scenario had been considered in isolation. If it was more optimistic, it would represent a contrast 
effect –ironically, access to the worst-case scenario would have had the effect of  increasing optimism. If it 
was more pessimistic, it would represent an assimilation effect –the information in the worst case scenario 
would have been assimilated with that in the best case scenario and led to a damping of the forecaster’s 
optimism. For the reasons we present below, we have reasons to expect that contrast effects will occur when  
point forecasts are based on extreme scenarios. In cases where organizations are employing scenario 
planning tools, such a bias could have important implications for the quality of strategic decisions. However, 
to our knowledge, this possibility has not previously been investigated in the literature. 
Forecasts are also often presented in the form of prediction intervals. Typically, the widths of 
judgmental prediction intervals are too narrow, suggesting that people are overconfident that an elicited 
interval will capture the realised outcome (e.g. Ben-David, Graham and Harvey, 2013). Confidence in one’s 
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forecasts tends to increase disproportionately as the amount of available information increases, even when 
this information is irrelevant to the forecast (Oskamp, 1965; Hall, Ariss and Todorov, 2007). Given that 
information in one scenario is not relevant to a forecast based on a second scenario, we  also examine 
whether the implied level of confidence associated with such a forecast increases when the opposing 
scenario is also available. 
In this paper we present two experiments that were used to explore whether the perceived  
implications of worst and best-case scenarios, expressed as point forecasts and prediction intervals, are 
context dependent, and whether any perceived dependence between mutually-exclusive scenarios is related 
to the ‘extremity’ of the arguments presented within them. Following a review of the relevant literature, we 
give details of the design and implementation of the experiments, before presenting the results and analysis 
and discussing their practical implications. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Examples of context effects 
Perhaps the best known example of context dependence is the halo effect, which was discovered in the 
1920s (Thorndike, 1920). In a task that involved rating  army officers on a number of attributes, such as 
intelligence, physique and leadership,  Thorndike found that people were unable to rate each attribute 
independently of the others. For example, there was evidence that an officer who was perceived to be 
intelligent also tended to be perceived as having a strong physique. Although there were problems with 
Thorndike’s  measurement scales a large number of subsequent studies  have reached similar conclusions in  
a wide range of domains  (e.g.  Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; O’Donnell and Schultz, 2005; Chernev and  Blair, 
2015).  Context dependence has also been found to apply in choice tasks where the addition to the choice set 
of alternatives that are vastly inferior to  existing options  -and hence irrelevant to the choice between them -  
changes the way that these existing options are valued  (Louie, Khaw and Glimcher, 2013; Soltani,De 
Martino and Camerer., 2012; Vlaev, Chater, Stewart and Brown, 2011). Context effects on choice can also 
be found where consumers are presented with superior products or services that are unavailable –so called 
‘phantom decoys’ (Scarpi and Pizzi, 2013, Trueblood and Pettibone, 2017). For example, these can be 
influential when consumers are belatedly informed that a favoured product is out of stock (Pizzi and Scarpi, 
2013). In other work, Stewart, Chater and Brown (2006) suggest that the values people attach to the 
attributes of an option in decision making can depend on other values in the decision context, such as the 
attribute values of competing options. Similarly, the provision to judges of potential  anchors, which have 
values that are so implausible that they are irrelevant to the estimation task in hand, has been found to 
influence the subsequent values estimated. For example,  in one study people who were initially asked 
whether Gandhi’s age at  death was higher or lower than 9, produced significantly lower estimates of his age 
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than those who were initially asked where his age at death was higher or lower than 140 (Strack and 
Mussweiler, 1997).  
2.2 Assimilation and contrast effects 
Context dependence can result in either assimilation effects or contrast effects.  An assimilation effect 
occurs when a person’s response to a target stimulus is positively correlated with contextual information, as 
in the anchoring bias described above that is widely observed in forecasting tasks (Lawrence and O’Connor, 
1992; Bolger and Harvey, 1993). This effect can also be seen in psychology experiments where tasks 
completed earlier set a context for later tasks which the experimenter has intended to be viewed 
independently. For example, in an experiment-based study of judgmental extrapolation of time series, 
Harvey and Reimers (2013) partly attributed their finding that forecasters tended to damp trends to an 
assimilation effect.   In this case, it appeared that people tended to regress their estimate of a given trend 
towards the mean trend that they had observed in other series used in the experiment.  
When a person’s response to a target stimulus is negatively correlated with contextual information, a 
contrast effect occurs.  For example, in an early experiment, participants rated weights as being lighter than 
they actually were, immediately after lifting a heavier weight (Sherif, Taub and Hovland, 1958).  Contrast 
effects have been found in areas ranging from legal decision making (Kelman, Rottenstreich and Tversky, 
1996) to consumer choice, where a product may appear to be less attractive than it would be when 
considered in isolation, when it is compared to much more attractive alternatives (Simonson and Tversky, 
1992). 
2.3 Factors determining whether an assimilation or a contrast effect occurs 
A  number of factors may be responsible for whether an assimilation or contrast effect occurs.  Basing their 
theory on the  inclusion/exclusion model (IEM) model of Schwarz and Bless (1992a),  Förster, Liberman 
and Kuschel (2008) suggest that, when similarity-orientated processing is invoked, this is likely to result in 
assimilation. In this mode of thinking a person will focus on the similarities between the context and the 
target stimuli and they may base their interpretation of the target on the characteristics of the context. 
Dissimilarity-orientated, or comparative, processing on the other hand is likely to be associated with a 
contrast effect. In this case, the focus will be on the differences between the context and target.  This raises 
the question of which features of a judgmental task are likely to lead to each type of thinking. The literature 
has identified the following features. 
(i) The distance between context and target. Early research found that, when people made 
quantitative judgments, the distance on a scale between the context and the target determined the 
type of response. In an experiment, where people had to assess how heavy pairs of weights were, 
the first weight (the context) was defined as the one at the top of the scale and the second, 
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generally lighter  weight, had to be rated against it  (Sherif et al., 1958).  If the two weights were 
similar the estimate tended to move upwards towards the ‘context’ weight (an assimilation effect), 
but if the ‘context’ weight was much heavier than the target a contrast effect occurred and  the 
second weight was regarded as being lighter. The contrast effect increased the greater the 
distance of the context weight from the target weight. More recent research by Chien, Wegener, 
Hsiao and Petty (2010) suggests that, where the plausible ranges of  values of the context and 
target stimuli are perceived to overlap, an assimilation effect will probably occur. When they do 
not, a contrast effect is likely.  
(ii) The ambiguity of target stimulus. Herr, Sherman and Fazio (1983) showed that an assimilation 
effect is likely when the target stimulus is both ambiguous and in close proximity to the 
contextual stimulus.  Ambiguity is the extent to which a stimulus can be interpreted in diverse 
ways. When a target stimulus is highly ambiguous the contextual stimulus may prime the target 
to be interpreted in a way that  is consistent with it, thereby leading to assimilation. However, an 
unambiguous target stimulus would, according to Herr et al. be expected to result in a contrast 
effect, especially where both the target and contextual stimuli are extremes. 
(iii) The distinctiveness of the contextual information.  Stapel and Winkielman (1998) found that, 
where the contextual information is distinct and accessible, it is more likely to act as comparison 
standard and hence lead to a contrast effect.  Indistinct or abstract contextual  information is less 
accessible and hence likely to lead to such an effect. 
(iv) The dimensional relevance of the contextual information. The contextual information  will be 
more likely to lead to a comparative mode of thinking  and hence to a contrast effect when is 
seen as being relevant to the dimension on which the target  stimulus is being assessed (Stapel 
and Winkielman,1998). For example, contextual information that   specifies a how heavy  a 
weight is will clearly be relevant when the heaviness of another weight is being assessed. 
Contextual information about the shape of the weight would not have dimensional relevance.  
(v) Whether an explicit evaluation is made of the contextual information. An explicit evaluation of 
the context is likely to make its mental representation concrete and distinct. This reification 
means that the contextual information is likely to form a comparison standard and hence be 
conducive to a contrast effect (Stapel and Winkielman,1998). 
(vi) The time interval between presentation of the context and target stimuli. Manis and Moore 
(1978) found that short time intervals between the presentation of context and target stimuli 
(these were polarised messages concerning social issues or irrelevant messages) tended to lead to 




We are not aware of any research that has looked at the possibility that one scenario can act as a context 
for another when people are judging the implications of a given scenario in order to make a forecast. 
However, if the findings of the foregoing research apply to scenarios, then a number of inferences can be 
drawn.  First,  if the context and target scenarios are extremes (as in ‘best-case and ‘worst-case’ scenarios), 
then this is likely to lead to a contrast effect. However, the extent of this may depend on  the degree of 
extremity of the context scenario. Secondly, the probability of a contrast effect will depend on the extent to 
which the scenarios lack ambiguity and are distinctive. For example, scenarios that convey a mixture of 
optimism and pessimism may be perceived as being more ambiguous and hence more conducive to an 
assimilation effect.   An assimilation effect may also be more likely when the scenarios describe the future 
on different dimensions. For example, if a context scenario relating to a country confines itself to  describing 
future rate of inflation  and unemployment in a country, while the target scenario only describes  future rates 
of pollution and crime, the two scenarios can be ‘interweaved’ and hence assimilated. None of the variables 
described in the context scenario would provide a comparison standard for those in the target scenario. 
Finally, we anticipate that the act of making a forecast based on the context scenario (in addition to a 
forecast for the target scenario) will reify the scenario and hence make it more likely to act as a basis of 
comparison and engender a contrast effect. 
2.4 Hypotheses 
This discussion suggests the following hypotheses when people undertake a task of  making point forecasts 
based on worst and best case scenarios that are extreme, unambiguous, non-abstract and describe possible 
futures based on the same dimensions. 
H1: Exposure to a worst case scenario will lead  to more optimistic forecasts based on a best-case scenario. 
Similarly, exposure to  a best case scenario  will lead  to more pessimistic forecasts based on a worst-
case scenario (i.e. contrast effects will be observed). 
H2: The degree of extremity of the context scenario will determine the size of the contrast effect. 
H3: The occurrence of a contrast effect is dependent on whether or not a forecast was previously made for  
the context scenario. 
Point forecasts do not provide any information about the degree of uncertainty associated with a 
forecast and this information can be crucial for any subsequent decisions (Goodwin,  2014). Prediction 
intervals do provide this information, but as indicated earlier, when they are based on judgment, there is a 
tendency for them to be too narrow. As a result, they manifest overconfidence in that the probability of them 
capturing the outcome tends to be less than the stated coverage probability (e.g. Ben-David et al., 2013. 
Welsh and Begg, 2018). Given the evidence that overconfidence increases when more information is 
available, even when the extra information is irrelevant (e.g. Oskamp, 1965; Hall et al., 2007), we expect 
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that people will produce narrower prediction intervals for forecasts based on a  given scenario when they 
also have access to information on an opposing scenario. Hence, we have the following hypothesis. 
H4: Prediction intervals produced for  a given scenario are narrower when an opposing scenario has also 
been presented to the forecaster. 
3. Method: Experiment 1 
3.1 Design of experiment 
Experiment 1 was designed to test H1, H2 and H4.  The participants’ task related to the production of 
demand forecasts based on the assumption that a given ‘background’ scenario would prevail.1 A total of 114 
business students from Bilkent and Sabancı Universities participated in a task that had a paper-and-pencil 
format. The task involved the use of judgment to produce the forecasts for a company marketing high 
technology products and services such as fitness monitoring devices, drones and a movie streaming service. 
The participants received an individual forecast form that included background information about the 
company and its forecasting procedure, together with time-series plots showing past demand for eight  
products (see Appendix 1 for an example of an instruction form supplied to a participant for one of the 
products ).  Each plot displayed 10 months of data.  Participants received these series and their associated 
scenario in a randomized order. The formula used for the generating each series was: 
Yt = 125 + et  et ~N(0,20)   (1) 
where Yt =  the demand in month t and et = the level of noise in month t. 
Because the focus of the study was on the possible interaction between scenarios, the plots were intended to 
have, as far as possible, a neutral effect, providing guidance only on the typical level and variation of 
demand. Hence, they did not contain autocorrelations, trends or seasonal patterns.  
The participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Those in Group 1 were presented 
with a single best or worst-case scenario (Depending on the product or service, this scenario was either 
extreme or moderate in its pessimism or optimism the same level of optimism or pessimism was  always 
associated with a given product).  The participants were then asked  to assume that this scenario applied to 
market conditions in month 20 (ten months ahead of the latest demand  figure)  and to produce: i) a point 
forecast, ii) a best case forecast and iii) a worst case forecast of demand in this month. This process was 
carried out for 8 products or services. The extreme or moderate levels of optimism or pessimism were 
achieved by varying the tone of the scenario vignettes by manipulating the words used (the full set of 
scenarios are available from the authors). The content and the amount of information conveyed were kept 
                                                          
1 There is a clear distinction between scenarios and forecasts and the terms are not being conflated here. In the experiment the 
scenarios provided the context and the forecasts provided the estimates of future demand conditional on that context. 
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the same across scenarios with different levels of optimism or pessimism. In total, the participants saw two 
extreme and two moderate worst-case scenarios and two extreme and moderate best-case scenarios (i.e. a 
total of 8 scenarios, one for each product). 
Participants in Group 2 received the same scenarios as those in Group 1, but they also received a 
moderate second scenario that was opposite in polarity to the first   For example, when the first scenario was 
extremely pessimistic, the second conveyed moderate optimism.  Having read the two scenarios, they were 
then asked to produce a point forecast and a best case and worst case forecast of demand in month 20 
assuming that the first scenario was applicable to the market conditions in that month. Following this, they 
were asked to produce a second set of forecasts, assuming that the second scenario was applicable. The main 
purpose of asking for the second set of forecasts was to ensure that both scenarios were read by the 
participants.  
Participants in Group 3 carried out the same task  as those in Group 2, except that the second 
scenario was extreme in tone.  For example, when the first scenario was extremely pessimistic, the second 
conveyed extreme optimism. Having made all their forecasts participants completed an exit questionnaire 
that was designed to ascertain their feelings about the task and the role of the scenarios. 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to compare the mean point forecasts of the groups for cases 
where the target scenario was i) extremely pessimistic, ii) moderately pessimistic, iii) moderately optimistic 
and iv) extremely optimistic. It was considered to be reasonable to average the pairs of point forecasts for 
each condition as the underlying generating mechanism was the same (see equation 1). 
In the exit poll the participants were given questions that asked them to indicate on a 1 (Totally 
disagree) to 5 (Totally agree) scale their evaluation of the scenarios they were given. In particular, they rated 
whether they believed the scenarios “enhanced their future-focused thinking”, “were useful in constructing 
the forecasts”, “were clear to understand”, “were realistic” and “provided important additional information 
that helped in constructing the forecasts”.  Again, one-way ANOVAs were applied to the responses. 
3.2  Results of experiment 1 
3.2.1 Point forecasts 
Tables 1(a) to 1(d) show the results of the ANOVAs. All indicated significant differences between the 
groups’ mean point forecasts (in all cases the test statistic was F2,111; this had values between 3.6 and  19.5 
and p-values ranged  from 0.03 to below 0.0005). Also, in all cases, apart from the results in Table 1(b),  eta-
squared  suggested that the presence of ‘opposing’ scenarios tended to have a  medium to large effect on the 
forecasts (Cohen, 1988). The results provide evidence of a significant contrast effect in all cases.  For 
example, those who only received a moderate pessimistic scenario tended to produce higher point forecasts  
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than those who also received a moderate or extreme optimistic scenario and who were asked to assume that 
the pessimistic scenario would prevail (see Table 1a). Access to an optimistic scenario appeared to make 
people more pessimistic when judging the implications of the pessimistic scenario.  The reverse was true 
when people were asked to make point forecasts assuming that an optimistic scenario would ensue.  In this 
case, access to a pessimistic scenario tended to make them more optimistic. In addition stronger ‘opposing’ 
scenarios tended to lead to a greater contrast effect, though this effect was relatively small when point 
forecasts were being made for an extreme optimistic scenario (see Table 2(d)). These results provide support 
for H1 and H2. 
**Please insert Tables 1(a) to 1(d) about here** 
3.2.2 Prediction intervals  
As indicated above, participants were also asked to produce best and worst case forecasts under the 
assumption that a given scenario applied. The width of the interval between these two forecasts can  be 
interpreted as a measure of the degree of uncertainty that the participant associated with their point forecast.   
Table 2 displays the results of one-way ANOVAs that were used compare, for the three groups, the mean 
interval widths of forecasts made for the four types of scenario.  It can be seen in all cases that the mean 
intervals became significantly narrower when ‘opposing’ scenarios were presented (in all cases the test 
statistic was F2,111; this had values between 3.3 and  35.3 and p-values ranged  from 0.041 to below 0.0005). 
They were also narrower when the ‘opposing’ scenario was extreme rather than moderate.  Thus, ironically, 
participants typically were more confident about their point forecast that assumed a given scenario would 
prevail when they were also presented with scenarios that described an opposite view of possible future 
market conditions. Not only was there a contrast effect, but access to opposing scenarios also appeared to 
reduce the uncertainty that participants had about their point forecasts.  
**Please insert Table 2 about here** 
3.2.3 Exit poll 
Recall that, in the exit poll, the participants rated whether they believed the scenarios “enhanced their future-
focused thinking”, “were useful in constructing the forecasts”, “were clear to understand”, “were realistic” 
and “provided important additional information that helped in constructing the forecasts”.  One-way 
ANOVAs showed, the participants’ responses, summarized in Figure 1, were not significantly different 
across the three groups (in all cases the test statistic was F2,111; all p-values were greater than 0.4). 
Furthermore, t-tests revealed that they were significantly different than 3 (all p-values<0.001, two-tail, for 
all comparisons), indicating that the participants found the scenarios to be meaningful and helpful. The exit 
poll also asked the participants to indicate on a 1 to 5 scale whether they found the products and services of 
the company attractive and appealing. The average response to this question was 3.6 for those receiving a 
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single scenario (Group 1), 3.77 for those receiving two scenarios including a moderate opposing scenario 
(Group 2), and 3.51 for those receiving two scenarios including an extreme opposing scenario (Group 3); all 
were significantly higher than 3 when t-tests were applied (all p-values<0.001, two-tail), suggesting the 
participants found the task interesting, and were motivated to complete the forecasts.       
**Please insert Figure 1 about here** 
4. Method: Experiment 2 
4.1 Design of Experiment 
Experiment 2 was conducted to investigate: (i) whether the findings of contrast effects in the first 
experiment also applied in a different context (this was to assess how generalizable the findings might be) 
and (ii) to test H3, that is to establish whether a contrast effect only applied when a point forecast was also 
made for the context scenario. Recall that the literature suggests that requiring a point forecast would make 
the context  scenario more concrete in the forecast’s mind and hence be more likely to lead to a contrast 
effect. To further test the robustness of  the findings of experiment 1,  in this second experiment the 
forecasts for the target scenario were elicited after the forecasts for the context scenario, rather than before. 
All the scenarios in this experiment were extreme.  
This time the participants’ task related to the production of stock market forecasts based on the 
assumption that a given scenario relating to the economic health of a country would prevail in ten months’ 
time. A total of 90 business students from Bilkent and Sabancı Universities participated in a task that, once 
again had a paper-and-pencil format. The participants assumed the role of forecasters in an international 
consulting company. They each received an individual forecast form that included background information 
about the consultancy company and its forecasting procedure, together with time-series plots showing the 
values of each country’s  stock market index for the past ten months.  Forecasts for eight countries, 
presented in random order were required  (see Appendix 2 for an example of an instruction form supplied to 
a participant for one of the countries). The formula used for the generating each series was: 
It = 100 + it  it ~N(0,30)   (2) 
where It =  the value of the index in month t and et = the level of noise in month t. 
Again, because the focus of the study was on the possible interaction between scenarios, the plots were 
intended to have, as far as possible, a neutral effect, providing guidance only on the typical level and 




The participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups of 30. Those in Group 1 were 
presented with a single scenario. Depending on the country. this scenario was either extremely pessimistic or 
optimistic. The participants were then asked  to assume that this scenario applied to economic conditions in 
month 20 and to produce: i) a rating of the scenario for its degree of optimism or pessimism on a -5 (extreme 
pessimism) to +5 (extreme optimism) scale,  ii) a point forecast, iii) a best case forecast and iv) a worst case 
forecast of the index’s value in this month. In total, each participant received four extreme worst case 
scenarios and four extreme best-case scenarios.  
Participants in Group 2 received the same best and worst-case scenarios as those in Group 1, but they 
also received a second extreme scenario that was opposite in polarity to the first. . As far as possible, the 
aspects of each economy that was described in the worst and best case scenarios for a given country were 
the same, they simply differed in their polarity. For example, when the first scenario was extremely 
optimistic, the second conveyed extreme pessimism.  Having read the two scenarios, they were then asked to 
give a rating of the degree of optimism or pessimism implied by the scenarios. However, the point,  best 
case and worst case forecasts were only required for the second scenario. This was to establish whether not 
being required to make a forecast for the context scenario reduced the likelihood of a contrast effect (as 
suggested by H3). The requirement to rate both scenarios was intended to ensure that both had been read.  
Participants in Group 3 carried out the same task  as those in Group 2, except that the they were also 
required to produce forecasts for both scenarios.   
Having made all their forecasts participants completed an exit questionnaire that was designed to 
ascertain their feelings about the task and the role of the scenarios. One-way ANOVAs were conducted to 
compare the mean point forecasts of the groups for cases where the target scenario was i) extremely 
pessimistic and ii) extremely optimistic. The exit poll asked the same questions as those in Experiment 1, 
plus questions on whether the participants had carefully read the provided scenario and whether, overall, 
they felt satisfied with their forecasts (the responses were again on a scale from 1(totally disagree) to 5 
(totally agree). As before, one-way ANOVAs were applied to the responses. 
4.2  Results of Experiment 2 
4.2.1 Point forecasts 
Table 3 show the results of the ANOVAs . Both indicated significant differences between the groups’ mean 
point forecasts  (F2,87 equalled 13.4  and 7.1, yielding p-values of less than 0.0005 and 0.001, respectively). 
The eta-squared  values suggested that the nature of the task carried out by each group tended to have a  
medium to large effect on the forecasts (Cohen, 1988). The tasks of Group 1, who received a single scenario, 
and Group 3 who received two scenarios, including an extreme opposing scenario, largely replicated those 
in Experiment 1. Forecasts made for worst-case scenarios tended to be more pessimistic when an opposing 
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best-case scenario had also been read, indicating a contrast effect (p =0.0004 in a one-tail pairwise 
comparison t-test of the group 1 and Group 3 mean forecasts, which is easily significant after Bonferroni 
adjustment). Similarly, forecasts made for a best-case scenario tended to more optimistic when an opposing 
worst-case scenario had also been read –though here the effect was not as large and is not quite significant at 
the 5% level (p =0.073 in a one-tail pairwise comparison t-test). Despite this, the results broadly provide 
further support for H1. 
**Please insert Table 3 about here** 
However, Group 2, who received two scenarios, including an extreme opposing scenario did not exhibit a 
contrast effect. Recall that, despite seeing and rating the two scenarios this group, unlike Group 3, only 
made a forecast for one of them. The forecasts of participants in this group tended to move in the direction 
of the context scenario, indicating a small assimilation effect (though this was only significant at the 5% 
level, after Bonferroni adjustment, when forecasts were made for best case scenarios). This finding supports 
H3. It appears that, for a contrast effect to occur, a forecast also has to be made for the context scenario. This 
is consistent with the idea that  the act of making a forecast based on a scenario reifies that scenario so it is 
more likely to act as a comparison standard.  
4.2.2 Prediction intervals and ratings of scenarios  
Table 4 shows that the finding of  Experiment 1, that providing two scenarios leads to a narrowing of the 
mean prediction intervals, was also replicated in the second experiment. The mean interval width for the 
target scenario of participants in Group  1, who received one scenario, was significantly narrower than that 
of  Group 3, who received two scenarios (p< 0.0005 in one-tail pairwise comparison t-test for both worst-
case and best-case target scenarios). This provides further support for H4. However, once again the result for 
Group 2 ,who received two scenarios but only produced a forecast for one, did not conform to this pattern. 
Indeed, the mean interval widths for this group were not significantly different at the 5% level from those of  
Group 1 who only saw the target scenario  (p= 0.084 in a one-tail pairwise comparison t-test for worst-case 
target scenarios; p =0.975 for best-case target scenarios).  
**Please insert Table 4 about here** 
**Please insert Table 5 about here** 
Table 5 show the mean ratings made by the participants of the degree of optimism and pessimism of 
the target and context scenarios. Although they are all in the expected directions, the mean ratings tended to 
be conservative. Despite the scenarios representing extreme economic conditions, their mean absolute rating 
was 2.8 (recall that the maximum absolute value was 5 for extreme optimism or pessimism). ANOVAs 
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indicated that Group 2, who saw two scenarios, but only produced a forecast for one, produced ratings that 
were significantly more conservative than the other group(s) when the target scenario was extremely 
pessimistic and the context  scenario was extremely optimistic (F2,87  =4.1, p=0.02 for the target scenario. 
F1,58 = 5.7, p=0.02 for the context scenario). However, there was no significant difference between the 
groups when the target scenario was extremely optimistic. Nor were there any significant differences 
between the mean ratings of the target and context scenarios by the participants who saw both scenarios.  
4.2.3 Exit poll 
The ANOVAs  showed no significant differences between the three groups in their responses to any of the 
questions (p-values ranged from 0.1 to 0.9).  On all questions, the mean response of all 90 of the participants 
was significantly greater than 3 (p-values<0.001 on two-tail t-tests, for all comparisons), suggesting in 
particular, that they agreed that the scenarios enhanced their future-focussed thinking, were useful in 
constructing the forecasts, were clearly understood, were realistic and provided important additional 
information when the forecasts were constructed (for brevity, we have not included a radar chart for this 
experiment). 
5. Discussion 
The experiments yielded four main findings. First, people tended to manifest a contrast effect. When asked 
to judge the implications of a best-case scenario, individuals made forecasts that were more positive if they 
also had access to a worst-case scenario.  Similarly, when asked to judge the implications of a worst-case 
scenario, their forecasts were more negative if they also had access to a best-case scenario. Second, as 
shown by the results of Experiment 1, the extent of the contrast effect was dependent on the extremity of the 
context scenario –less extreme context scenarios tended to have a smaller contrast effect. Third, the contrast 
effect was dependent on the participant making a forecast for the context scenario. Fourth, access to the 
‘opposing’ scenario made participants more confident about their point forecasts, but again only if they had 
made a forecast for the context scenario.  
5.1 Contrast effects 
The results are therefore consistent with research in other contexts which suggests that a contrast effect will 
occur when the target scenarios is unambiguous (Herr at al., 1983) and the context scenario is regarded as a 
standard for comparison because it is extreme (Herr at al., 1983), distinct, rather than abstract,  relevant to 
the dimension of the target stimulus (Stapel and Winkielman, 1998) and  reified by being subject to an 
evaluation. The short time interval between the reading of the context and target  scenarios may also have 
contributed to the contrast effect (Manis and Moore, 1978). As discussed earlier, Chien et al (2010) suggest 
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that contrast effects are more likely when the plausible ranges of the context and target stimuli are perceived 
to be non-overlapping. In both experiments where participants made a forecast for both scenarios we 
examined the extent to which their prediction intervals overlapped. In experiment 1, where  a moderate 
context scenario was presented, the prediction intervals were non-overlapping 55% of the time; when an 
extreme context scenario was presented they were non-overlapping  81% of the time. In experiment 2, 69% 
of the intervals did not overlap. Hence a perception of non-overlapping scales may also have contributed to 
the observed contrast effects when the context scenario was extreme. 
One possibility is that the contrast effects observed in Group 3 (who saw two scenarios and produced 
forecasts for both) in both experiments merely reflected a superficial tendency of the participants to set their 
two point forecasts widely apart to indicate that they had read both scenarios. Indeed, the failure to observe a 
contrast effect for group 2  (who  saw two scenarios but only produced forecasts for one of them) in 
Experiment 2 would be consistent with this. Give that this group saw both a context and target scenario,  but 
only produced a forecast for the latter, they would have had no need to distinguish their forecast from one 
based on the opposing scenario. However, the results of experiment 1 provide evidence that this superficial 
tendency did not apply.  In this experiment, those who saw two scenarios made the forecast for the target 
scenario first so, at this point, there was no forecast for the context scenario from which they might try to 
diverge –though the participants would have been aware that a forecast for the context scenario would 
subsequently be required (see Appendix 1). Also, as shown in Table 1, moderate context scenarios led to a 
smaller contrast effect then more extreme context scenarios, as predicted by the literature (e.g. Sherif et al., 
1958). If the participants were merely arbitrarily setting their two forecasts widely apart, then there was no 
reason to expect this effect. In addition, recall that a contrast effect was not observed in the participants’ 
rating of the scenarios in experiment 2.  Had the participants simply been signalling that they had read the 
scenarios, it seems likely that the groups who saw both scenarios would also have produced more divergent 
ratings, as well as more divergent point forecasts. 
This raises the question of why the act of merely rating the context scenario in the task carried out by 
group 2 in experiment 2,  who saw two scenarios but only made a forecasts for one of them,  did not lead to 
a contrast effect like that observed in group 3, who produced forecasts for both scenarios. Recall that the 
ratings were made on scale from -5 (extremely pessimistic) to +5 (extremely optimistic). It is possible that, 
when the participants rated the pessimistic and optimistic scenarios,   they regarded the negative  and 
positive parts of the scale as two separate scales  -a pessimism scale and an optimism scale.  For example 
they would be unlikely to think in terms, such as: ‘this  best-case scenario is six  points more optimistic than 
the alternative worst-case scenario’. As such, the rating element of the task, unlike the forecasting element, 
would not lead to a direct comparison of the scenarios. The focus would be on each scenario in turn. This 
would be unlikely to engender dissimilarity-orientated, or comparative, processing.  For each country, we 
also calculated the correlation of the participants’ rating for the target scenario with their point forecast. The 
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mean correlations (averaged across the scenarios)  ranged from only 0.16 to 0.24 for the three groups, 
suggesting that the ratings  had little relationship with the forecasting element of the task. This further 
supports the idea that the rating and forecasting aspects of the task drew on different modes of thinking.  
5.2 Prediction intervals 
The higher confidence, represented by the narrower intervals around the point forecasts of the people in 
group 3 in both experiments who were presented with two scenarios is consistent with earlier findings that 
confidence in forecasts can increase as more, and even irrelevant, information, becomes available to the 
forecaster (e.g. Oskamp, 1965; Hall et al., 2007). Normatively, the opposing forecast was irrelevant when 
determining the range between the worst and best case forecast for the target scenario. Again, it is possible 
that the narrower intervals produced by participants who saw two scenarios in both experiments merely 
reflected a desire to keep the  prediction intervals for the two scenarios apart by avoiding an overlap. 
However, as we pointed out earlier, in experiment 1 the prediction interval for the target scenario was 
elicited before that of the context scenario so, at this stage, there was no alternative prediction interval with 
which overlap needed to be avoided. In experiment 2, despite having access to information about two 
scenarios, the mean width of intervals produced by group 2 in experiment 2  was not significantly narrower 
than that of group 1, who only saw one scenario.  This may be because the act of merely rating the context 
scenario did not make the information  in this scenario as salient as it was for members of group 3, who 
produced a forecast for this scenario, but further work would be needed to establish this.  
Other studies have found that there were unwarranted increases in confidence in predictions when 
people were supplied with scenarios (Schnaars and Topol, 1987; Kuhn and Sniezek, 1996; Önkal, Sayım and 
Gönül, 2013). However, it is important to distinguish between a prediction interval constructed with each 
limit in turn being based on an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario respectively, as in these studies and a 
prediction interval based on the assumption that a single scenario will prevail –as in the current study. While 
these earlier studies have reported a tendency for forecasters to be overconfident   -in that their intervals are 
overly narrow -the findings of a contrast effect in the current study may actually offer a means of 
counteracting overconfidence  in that the presentation of an opposing scenario can push the target best and 
worst case forecasts to more extreme values. For example, eliciting a best case forecast under an optimistic 
scenario (with a pessimistic scenario also presented) and then a worst case forecast under the pessimistic 
scenario (with the optimistic scenario also still presented) should lead to the production of wider interval 
than one where the opposing scenarios were not present.  
Of course, further research would be needed to establish how far overconfidence would be mitigated 
and whether there is a danger that the resulting interval would be so wide that it manifested under 
confidence.  However, the extent to which the procedure can lead to wide intervals is evidenced by those 
obtained from participants in Group 3 in experiment 1. Recall that participants in this group produced 
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forecasts for the two scenarios they saw. When, in each case, the context and target scenarios were extreme 
the mean difference between their best case forecast, based on the optimistic scenario, and worst case 
forecast, based on the pessimistic scenario, was 5.4 times the standard deviation of noise (recall this was 20 
units) in the demand series. Of course, the potential uncertainty about the future demand level would be 
determined not only by noise, but also by events like those described in the scenarios. However, for 
comparison, it is worth noting that a statistically-based 99% prediction interval, given this level of noise, 
would have a width of 5.2 standard deviations. 
5.3 Limitations  
Our study has a number of limitations.  The scenarios were entirely qualitative. For example, in experiment 
1, they did not contain quantitative data such as potential market size, demographic statistics, market 
research figures and likely prices relative to those of competitors. Nor did they contain historic statistics, 
which showed the past impact of factors like competition or regulatory changes, or probabilities that given 
scenarios would ensue.  In these respects they are typical of scenarios often used in strategic planning (van 
der Heijden, 1996) where high levels of uncertainty preclude the estimation of specific  values.  For 
example, consider these phrases used in scenarios produced by Statoil, a Norwegian oil and gas company 
(Ringland, 1998 p.253). ‘The gradual resolution of budget and trade  deficits result in higher levels of 
growth worldwide’,  ‘oil prices rebound’, ‘commodity and energy prices plunge’, ‘material and energy 
intensity declines dramatically’.  There are no specifications of what the future levels of growth, prices or 
intensity will be. The emphasis is on direction and magnitude is expressed in semantic terms. In addition, 
probabilities are absent because the role of the scenarios is not to specify the relative likelihood of particular 
futures, but to establish bounds on the range of possible futures that may play out.  
Nevertheless, the participants may have been justified in asking, for example: how do I translate a   
statement like ‘Improvements to the model’s touchscreen and battery life are successfully implemented and 
praised in the media’ into a quantitative forecast and many of their freeform comments in the exit 
questionnaire to experiment 1 hinted at such questions. While experience in companies (Fildes, Goodwin, 
Lawrence and Nikolopoulos, 2009) suggests that forecasts are often based on qualitative information like 
our scenarios, there may be an underlying incompatibility between the qualitative nature of much scenario 
planning and the quantitative requirements of demand forecasts. Despite this we believe that our results are 
interesting in that our main aim was to detect the direction of any context effect, rather than its magnitude. It 
is even possible that the observed effect may have been more marked if the scenarios had contained more 
specific quantitative information as the literature review indicated that less vague stimuli are more likely to 
result in contrast effects. 
Secondly, while we asked individuals to make forecasts in both our experiments, often forecasts are 
agreed in social situations, such as forecast review meetings in companies (Fildes et al., 2009).  In this case, 
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different managers may present alternative scenarios –often based on their specialism - and the ensuing 
discussion will aim to take these into account. In these situations the resolved forecast may also be 
dependent on factors such as the force of personality and status of individual managers and the salience their 
scenarios have within the discussion.  
A third potential limitation is that the time series in our experiments covered only a few months and 
were purely random. However, again this reflects many practical contexts where product life cycles are short 
(e.g., Yelland, 2010; Hankammer and Steiner, 2015)  – particularly for the type of products used in 
experiment 1. In such short series, characteristics such as trends and seasonal patterns may be difficult to 
discern anyway. Recall also that the role of the series was simply to provide guidance on typical levels and 
variation of the variables to be forecast so that the focus could be on the implications of the scenarios.   
 A final potential limitation of this study is that the results are based on the participation of 
students in a laboratory experiment, rather than practising managers making forecasts at their place of work. 
However, the laboratory provided the benefits of a controlled environment so that other issues, such as 
company or national politics or having vested interests in the outcome, could be excluded.  Moreover, 
several studies have suggested that management students can act as reliable proxies for the behaviour of 
practising managers (Remus, 1986, Bolton, Ockenfels and Thonemann, 2012; Trottier and Gordon, 2016).  
6.0 Conclusions 
The main finding of this study is that, when individuals made assessments of the implications of scenarios, 
their forecasts were subject to context effects in the form of contrast effects.   This conflicts with the 
normative way in which scenarios should be treated –that is, they should be regarded as belonging to 
separate independent worlds so that one scenario does not have any implications for another. 
Our findings suggest a number of possible pathways for future research. We found that presenting 
two opposing scenarios implicitly increased participants’ confidence in their forecasts based on the target 
scenario, in that the prediction intervals they produced were narrower.  However, our study was not 
designed to investigate the effect of this on the calibration of the resulting prediction intervals.  These 
considerations are important because recent research has suggested that well calibrated prediction intervals 
can improve decision making (Ramos, Van Andel and Pappenberger, 2013; Savelli and Joslyn, 2013). 
Secondly, while our results may have implications for scenario planning methods that generate just 
two scenarios such as the extreme world method (e.g., Goodwin and Wright, 2014), it would be interesting 
to examine the extent to which context effects are likely to occur when other scenario planning methods, 
which yield more than two scenarios, are applied. For example, the intuitive logics method normally 
generates four scenarios with each scenario representing factors that are associated with extremes of impact 




Thirdly, the participants in our experiments had no role in the formulation of the scenarios. It would 
be interesting to investigate whether the same effects would be observed in situations where forecasters are 
also involved in the development and  writing of scenarios. 
 Fourth, because scenarios often represent sequences of events that unfold as a target future 
date is approached, their relationship to psychological work on how people perceive sequences may also be 
worth investigating (e.g. see Oskarsson, Van Boven, McClelland and Hastie, 2009). For example, if people 
believe in the gambler’s fallacy, they may perceive that a scenario that portrays a series of unmitigated 
negative events is implausible and attach less weight to its implications, or alternatively, they may judge that 
a turn in fortunes is overdue and make their forecasts accordingly. 
 Given that the focuses of our study have been on medium-term demand and stock market 
forecasting, further research would be needed to establish the extent to which the findings apply in other 
situations. For example, it  might even be extended to examine the effects of presenting of positive and 
negative scenarios in advertising designed to  encourage people to make better health-related decisions 
(Krishen and Bui, 2015).  If context effects are found to be common and potentially damaging when 
scenarios are being used as part of decision making processes, then it will be necessary to adopt methods 
that are likely to mitigate these effects  while benefiting from the richness provided by alternative scenarios 
when judgments are being elicited.  Efforts to support and enhance scenario technologies in decision making 
will benefit from examining the comparative impact of alternative scenario generation techniques on context 
effects.  
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TechGeek Company manufactures high technology products (such as drones, smart phones, wearable fitness 
devices etc.) and offers technology related services such as high-speed internet and movie/series 
streaming. Competition in this industry is very harsh in general. One of the major costs is related to 
research and development (R&D) for new products and innovations. As new technologies are being 
constantly introduced to the market, speed is essential for remaining competitive in today's digital era. 
Moreover, as new products and services are introduced into the market very quickly, existing ones have a 
very short span of life. If not sold, such ‘aged’ products increase the overall costs drastically. Finally, there 
are other potential costs to be minimised for technological products: firstly, the cost of over-production and 
the associated storage costs; and secondly, the cost of lost sales for to running out of stock as a result of 
under-production. Combined together, these factors amplify the importance of forecasting the demand 
correctly (with minimal error) for TechGeek Company’s various products and services.  
In order to improve the accuracy of its forecasts, TechGeek employs a combination approach that involves 
using the scenario method. Ten-month-ahead demand forecasts are generated at the beginning of each 
month (e.g., in the beginning of January demand forecasts of the coming November are constructed). This 
process works as follows:  
1. “Worst case” and/or “best case” scenarios for each product and service’s demand in the coming 10-
month period are developed by a team of experts in the company using all the information 
available. The basic rule in preparing and using these scenarios is that every scenario is equally 
plausible - these scenarios are constructed to depict ‘best’ and ‘worst’ plausible futures that need to 
be considered and prepared for regarding each product and service’s potential demand for the next 
period. 
2. The scenarios (generated by the expert team) are given to executives in charge of making forecasts. 
These people produce various forecasts (a point forecast, a best-case forecast and a worst-case 
forecast) in light of the scenario(s) and the demand history provided for each product and service. 
Your task in this study replicates this process
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Product A:  Tablet computer          Group 3 
 
Worst case scenario 
We start to receive many complaints that the built-in applications (apps) do not work properly 
with upgrades to our operating system. In addition, we receive reports that many touch 
screens are causing severe problems after a long period of use. A competitor launches a rival 
product which is slightly cheaper than Product A and offers significant advantages over it, 
including a more stylish look and superior screen display. The rival product receives much 
publicity and many positive reviews in the media. Market research reports indicate that 
potential new purchasers strongly favour the rival product. 
Best case scenario 
Product A has an expanding and loyal user base. It is improved with some significant and 
attractive modifications and more built-in applications (apps) and these receive enthusiastic 
reviews in industry magazines and in the wider media. In particular, the product continues to 
be regarded as the best of its type for its reliability and touch screen display. No models 
directly compete with this product in its market. Market research reports indicate that the 
product’s popularity is very high and that it is likely to continue to attract a significant 







































Product A:  Tablet computer          Group 3 
 
Assume that the worst case scenario applies to market conditions in month 20 
 
Please provide a  point forecast for demand in month 20 :                             ……………. 
 
Please provide a  best-case forecast (highest value predicted) for month 20 : …………… 
 




Assume that the best case scenario applies to market conditions in month 20 
 
Please provide a  point forecast for demand in month 20 :                             ……………. 
 
Please provide a  best-case forecast (highest value predicted) for month 20 : …………… 
 














EconGlobal Company is an international consulting company that generates stock market 
index forecasts for various countries to provide guidance to investors all over the world. 
Given the overall volatility of macroeconomical conditions worldwide, in order to improve 
the accuracy of its forecasts, EconGlobal employs a combination approach that involves using 
the scenario method. Ten-month-ahead stock market index forecasts are generated at the 
beginning of each month (e.g., in the beginning of January stock market index forecasts of 
the coming November are constructed). This process works as follows:  
1. “Worst case” and/or “best case” scenarios for each country’s overall economic 
outlook in the coming 10-month period are developed by a team of experts in the 
company using all the information available. The basic rule in preparing and using 
these scenarios is that every scenario is equally plausible - these scenarios are 
constructed to depict ‘best’ and ‘worst’ plausible futures that need to be considered 
and prepared for regarding each country’s potential economy for the coming 
periods. 
2. The scenarios (generated by the expert team) are given to executives in charge of 
making forecasts. These people produce various forecasts (a point forecast, a best-
case forecast and a worst-case forecast) in light of the scenario(s) and the stock 




Country: Tegoland                                                   Group 3 
 
BEST CASE scenario for Month 20  
The new government’s much anticipated ‘grow-the-economy’ budget  is already proving to be 
effective with  retail sales soaring according  to the latest Bloomberg monthly survey of retail 
purchasing managers. The positive economic outlook and declining  oil prices have also boosted 
consumer confidence and household spending, encouraged by  the US-led boom in the world 
economy. Growth in the Tegoland economy has been particularly responsive to these buoyant 
international conditions and  some economists think that this quarter may see the highest growth rates 
for the last quarter of a century. 
Rate this scenario for its degree of  pessimism or optimism  (circle the appropriate number) 
Extremely -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely 
Pessimistic 
           
Optimistic 
 
WORST CASE scenario for Month 20  
Retail sales in Tegoland declined in most of the last 6 months as a bleaker economic outlook damped 
consumer demand, according to the latest Bloomberg retail purchasing managers index monthly 
survey. Record oil prices have pushed up fuel costs, crimping household spending. Retail sales will 
tumble this quarter amid worsening economic conditions. The global outlook is darkening by the day, 
and Tegoland's low potential growth rate makes it particularly vulnerable to these dire international 
economic conditions. It looks almost certain that this quarter will be recorded as one of the deepest 
recessions in the last quarter of a century 
Rate this scenario for its degree of  pessimism or optimism  (circle the appropriate number) 
Extremely -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 Extremely 
Pessimistic 
           
Optimistic 









































Ben-David, I., Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2013). Managerial miscalibration. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 128, 1547-1584. 
 
Bolger, F., & Harvey, N. (1993). Context-sensitive heuristics in statistical reasoning. The 
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A, 46(4), 779-811. 
 
Bolton, G. E., Ockenfels, A., & Thonemann, U. W. (2012). Managers and students as 
newsvendors. Management Science, 58(12), 2225-2233. 
 
Chernev, A., & Blair, S. (2015). Doing well by doing good: the benevolent halo of corporate 
social responsibility. Journal of Consumer Research, 41(6), 1412-1425. 
 
Chien, Y. W., Wegener, D. T., Hsiao, C. C., & Petty, R. E. (2010). Dimensional range 




Cohen J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences. New York, NY: 
Routledge Academic. 
 
Fildes, R., Goodwin, P., Lawrence, M., & Nikolopoulos, K. (2009). Effective forecasting and 
judgmental adjustments: an empirical evaluation and strategies for improvement in supply-
chain planning. International Journal of Forecasting, 25(1), 3-23. 
 
Förster, J., Liberman, N., & Kuschel, S. (2008). The effect of global versus local processing 
styles on assimilation versus contrast in social judgment. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 94(4), 579. 
 
Goodwin, P. (2014). Getting real about uncertainty. Foresight: The International Journal of 
Applied Forecasting, (33), 4-7. 
 
Goodwin, P.  & Wright, G. (2014). Decision Analysis for management judgment, (5th ed.) 
Chichester UK: Wiley. 
 
Hall, C. C., Ariss, L., & Todorov, A. (2007). The illusion of knowledge: When more 
information reduces accuracy and increases confidence. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 103(2), 277-290. 
 
Hankammer, S., & Steiner, F. (2015). Leveraging the sustainability potential of mass 
customization through product service systems in the consumer electronics industry. 
Procedia CIRP, 30, 504-509. 
 
Harvey, N., & Reimers, S. (2013). Trend damping: Under-adjustment, experimental artifact, 
or adaptation to features of the natural environment? Journal of Experimental Psychology: 




Herr, P. M., Sherman, S. J., & Fazio, R. H. (1983). On the consequences of priming: 
Assimilation and contrast effects. Journal of experimental social psychology, 19(4), 323-340. 
 
Kelman, M., Rottenstreich, Y., & Tversky, A. (1996). Context-dependence in legal decision 
making. The Journal of Legal Studies, 25(2), 287-318. 
 
Krishen, A. S., & Bui, M. (2015). Fear advertisements: Influencing consumers to make better 
health decisions. International Journal of Advertising, 34(3), 533-548. 
 
Kuhn, K.M. &  Sniezek, J.A. (1996). Confidence and uncertainty in judgmental forecasting: 
differential effects of scenario presentation. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 9, 231–
247. 
 
Lawrence, M., & O'Connor, M. (1992). Exploring judgemental forecasting. International 
Journal of Forecasting, 8(1), 15-26. 
 
Louie, K., Khaw, M. W., & Glimcher, P. W. (2013). Normalization is a general neural 
mechanism for context-dependent decision making. Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 110(15), 6139-6144. 
 
Manis. M., & Moore, J. C. (1978) Summarizing controversial messages: Retroactive effects 
dueto subsequent information. Social Psychology, 41, 62-68. 
 
Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration 
of judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35(4), 250. 
 
O'Donnell, E., & Schultz Jr, J. J. (2005). The halo effect in business risk audits: Can strategic 
risk assessment bias auditor judgment about accounting details? The Accounting Review, 
80(3), 921-939. 
 
Önkal, D., Sayım, K. Z., & Gönül, M. S. (2013). Scenarios as channels of forecast advice. 
Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 80(4), 772-788. 
 
Oskamp, S. (1965). Overconfidence in case-study judgments. Journal of consulting 
psychology, 29(3), 261. 
 
Oskarsson, A. T., Van Boven, L., McClelland, G. H., & Hastie, R. (2009). What's next? 
Judging sequences of binary events. Psychological bulletin, 135(2), 262. 
 
Pizzi, G., & Scarpi, D. (2013). When out-of-stock products do backfire: Managing disclosure 
time and justification wording. Journal of Retailing, 89(3), 352-359. 
 
Plous, S. (1993). The psychology of judgment and decision making. New York: McGraw Hill 
Inc. 
 
Remus, W. (1986). Graduate students as surrogates for managers in experiments on business 
decision making. Journal of Business Research, 14(1), 19-25. 




Ramos, M. H., Van Andel, S. J., & Pappenberger, F. (2013). Do probabilistic forecasts lead 
to better decisions? Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 17, 2219-2232. 
 
Savelli, S., & Joslyn, S. (2013). The advantages of predictive interval forecasts for non‐expert 
users and the impact of visualizations. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 27(4), 527-541. 
 
Scarpi, D. and Pizzi, G. (2013). The impact of phantom decoys on choices and perceptions. 
Journal of Behavioural Decision Making, 26(5), 451-461. 
 
Schnaars, S.P. & Topol, M.T.(1987). The use of multiple scenarios in sales forecasting. An 
empirical test. International Journal of Forecasting 3, 405–419. 
 
Schwarz, N., & Bless, H. (1992a). Constructing reality and its alternatives: Assimilation and 
contrast effects in social judgment. In L. L. Martin & A. Tesser (Eds.), The construction of 
social judgments (pp. 217–245). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. 
 
Sherif, M., Taub, D., & Hovland, C. I. (1958). Assimilation and contrast effects of anchoring 
stimuli on judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55(2), 150. 
 
Simonson, I., & Tversky, A. (1992). Choice in context: Tradeoff contrast and extremeness 
aversion. Journal of Marketing Research, 29(3), 281-295. 
 
Soltani, A., De Martino, B., & Camerer, C. (2012). A range-normalization model of context-
dependent choice: a new model and evidence. PLoS Comput Biol, 8(7), e1002607. 
 
Stapel, D. A., & Winkielman, P. (1998). Assimilation and contrast as a function of context-
target similarity, distinctness, and dimensional relevance. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 24(6), 634-646. 
 
 
Stewart, N., Chater, N., & Brown, G. D. (2006). Decision by sampling. Cognitive 
Psychology, 53, 1-26. 
 
Strack, F., & Mussweiler, T. (1997). Explaining the enigmatic anchoring effect: Mechanisms 
of selective accessibility. Journal of Personality and Social psychology, 73(3), 437. 
 
Thorndike, E. L. (1920). A constant error in psychological ratings. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 4(1), 25-29. 
 
Trottier, K., & Gordon, I. M. (2016). Students as surrogates for managers: Evidence from a 
replicated experiment. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences/Revue Canadienne des 
Sciences de l'Administration. 
 
Trueblood, J. S., & Pettibone, J. C. (2017). The phantom decoy effect in perceptual decision 
making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 30(2), 157-167. 
 




Vlaev, I., Chater, N., Stewart, N., & Brown, G. D. (2011). Does the brain calculate value? 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 15(11), 546-554. 
 
 
Welsh, M. B., & Begg, S. H. (2018). More-or-less elicitation (MOLE): reducing bias in range 
estimation and forecasting. EURO Journal on Decision Processes, 6(1-2), 171-212. 
 
Wright, G., Bradfield, R., & Cairns, G. (2013). Does the intuitive logics method–and its 
recent enhancements–produce “effective” scenarios? Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, 80(4), 631-642. 
 
Yelland, P. M. (2010). Bayesian forecasting of parts demand. International Journal of 
















Group Target scenario Context scenario 
Mean point 
forecast SD 
1 Extreme pessimism None 93.4 15.0 
2 Extreme pessimism Extreme optimism 99.8 18.1 
3 Extreme pessimism Extreme optimism 78.9 15.0 
  
   
  
  F2,87 = 13.4   p<0.0005 η2= 23.5% 
 
 
   
     
Group Target scenario Context scenario 
Mean point 
forecast SD 
1 Extreme optimism None 111.9 16.2 
2 Extreme optimism Extreme pessimism 102.0 18.2 
3 Extreme optimism Extreme pessimism 118.3 16.1 
  
   
  
  F2,87 = 7.1   p=0.001 η2= 14.0% 
 












Table 5 Mean ratings of scenarios in Experiment 2 
 
